FromtheaboveSchickele（andHeadyafterhim）claimedthatpartofthenonl”efficient”（r=www.youxs.org）,andusingthehorizontalaxisoffigure4tomeasurenonlandinputsingeneral,Schickeleconcludedthat”ifthelandlordwouldshareequallyinalltheinputcostsgoingintocropproductiontheintensitywouldbecarriedto[t2],thatis,tothesamedegreewhichcorrespondstomaximumefficiency.”[19]Itseconomiccontentaside,whatcouldhavebeenmerelyageometric”accident”

and

（1-r）intomarginal（output）costcurves,butwiththecurvesarbitrarilydrawn.[20]Thus,:”Thecostofvariablefactors（whereonefactorsuchaslandisfixed）mustbedividedbetweenthelandlordandthetenantintheproportionsthatholdforthedivisionoftheproduct[toattainefficiency].”[21]Letmeclarify.

Returntofigure4,whereweuser=www.youxs.org（thatusedbySchickele）.Schickeleseemstohavetho,ifthelandownercontributesnonlandinputsfromt1tot2,hewouldthenbesharingexactlyhalfthenonlandinputcost-orsharingit”intheproportionsthatholdforthedivisionoftheproduct.”,recall,is1—rof

ateverypoint,www.youxs.org（accordingtothetax-equivalentanalysis）,thevalueoflandisstillpositive（sincethetotalproductisstillgreaterthanthetotalwage）.Woulditbesensibletosay,then,thatincertaincasesthevalueoflandtothetenantisposi-tivebutheisnotwillingtoofferanysharepaymentforitsuse?

Itisnotclearwhatismeantby”custom””custom”onlyassomethingnonpetitive,SchickeleandHeadyreferredtoboth”custom”and”pe-tition””custom”theymeantasitu,,www.youxs.org（seefigure4）,Issawiiadmittedthat,inhisanalysis:

Ithasbeenimplicitlyassumedthroughout……thatlandlordsdonotrespondreadilytosucheconomicmotivationsasthepossibilityofincreasingtheirinebyinvestment;iftheydid,thedistinctionbetweenfixedrentsandshare-croppingwould,naturally,,toalargeextent,heldtrueformostunderdevelopedcountriesand,toaslightlylesserextent,itstillholdstrue.[22]

Thiskindofanalysisisquitepopularin”underdevelopment”[23]JohnsonformalizedMarshallsanalysisingreaterdetail,:

Underacrop-sharelease,ifthelandlordsshareofthecropsishalf,thetenantwillapplyhisresourcesinproductionofcropsuntilthem,however,willconducthislivestockoperations,whereimportantcostsarebornebythelandlordandthereceiptsarenotsharedwithhim,productistwicethemarginalcost.[24]

Johnsonnoted,however,thathisanalysisisbasedon”circumstancesinwhich……thetenantandthelandlord……eachviewshisinterestseparately,”[25]whichissimilartoMarshallssuppositionthatthetenant”isfreetocultivateashechooses.”Thissupposition,ofcourse,,Johnsonsc

ButJohnsonwasreluctanttoaccepttheimplicationofinefficientresourceuseunderasharecontract,andhedevotedonesectiontoinvestigatingotherpossibleadjustments.[26]Hefoundthat,”thoughadmittedlyinadequate,theavailableevidenceindicatesthatthecrop-sharecontractyieldsatleastasmuch,ifnotmore,rentperacrethandoesthecashleaseonparablefarms.”[27]Inanattempttoreconcilethisapparentconflictbetweentheoryandfact,Johnsonarguedthatwithashort-termleasethetenantisnotreallyfreetocultivateinanywayheseesfit.[28]Thus,theactualintensityoftenantinput”willdependuponwhathethinkshecangetbywith.”[29]

ItisdifficulttounderstandwhyJohnsondidnotdiscardhistheoreticalanalysisandstartanew-byconsideringthatthecontractingpartiesarefreeonlytoacceptornottoacceptacontract,andthatthey”cangetbywith”,whichareimpliedbytheconstraintsofprivatepropertyrights,ntractareexpressedthroughth: