Inspections—initiallybyrandomsamplingandlateroftheaffectedpopulationintotal—conductedforatwo-yearperioduptoJune1951revealedotherformsofpensatingpayments:forty-twocasesinwhichlandownerschargeddepositmoneywithnorefund,forty-sevencasesinwhichthelandownershadcollectedrentonfarmhousesoverandabovetheoriginalstipula-tions,(6,328cases)wasrecordedinanitemcalled”harvestloss,”whichresultedmainlyfromdisagreementbetweenthecontractingpartiesonthe”actual”[8]

TenureRearrangements

Leasecancellationsbylandowne:

Afterthereductionoftherentalpercentage…aminorityoflandowners…threatenedthetenantswithleasecancellation.…Usuallywithcash,goods,orpartofthecultivatedland,”feeforleaseright.”Thetenants,infearoftheownerspower,,,soldthem,orhiredfarmhandstodothetilling,soastoprotecttheirillegalunscrupulousprofits.[9]

Inthetwo-yearperioduptoJune1951,disputesarisingfromleasecancellations(dismissals)amountedto16,349cases,ofwhich8,877casesinvolvedactualleasedismissal.[10]Theofficialsettlementsofleasecancellationsweretroublesome,sinceaccordingtothelawthelandownerswereallowe,971leasecancellationswereofficiallygranted,andtheremainingleaseswererestoredtothetenants.[11]Theareaoflandassociatedwiththesegrantedcasesamountedto1,376chias,ion.[12]

Duringthesameperiod(June1949toJune1951),thearea[13]Thisformoftransferwasallowedbyreformauthorit,landpricesmeasuredinriceforvariouslandgradesfellbyarangeof46to62percent[14]—,evenintheabsenceofpensatingpaymentorresourcereallocation,oninris,generatedbytheexpectationofotherreformmeasuresforthing.

Conclusions

Theevidenceofpensatingpaymentsandtenurerearrangementspresentedinthissectionillu(mostlyillegal)were”alarming,”availablesourcesindicatethattheyoccurredinnomorethan10percentofthetenantcontractsaffectedbytherentalrestriction,andthegreaterparerestrictiontotaled380,473,andcons,,,theenforcementofthesharerestrictionin1949wasregardedbythelawmakeras”incrediblysmooth.”[15]Why?Supposeweaskaseeminglyunrelatedquestion:Ifpensatingpaymentsandtenurerearrangementsdonottakeplacetotheextentofrestoringtheinitialresourceuse,whatadjustmentswillweobserveinresourceallocation?Asitturnsout,theanswertothishelps,inpart,toexplainwhytheillegalpracticeswereinfrequent:thelandownercouldprotecthisrentalinefromlandafterthepercentagereduction,withoutviolatingthelaw,throughadjustingfarmingintensity.

[1].SeeChengChen,RecordsofTaiwanLandReform(Taipei:ChungHwaBookCo.,1961),

[2].Sino-AmericanJointCommissiononRuralReconstruction,”JCRRAnnualReportsonLandReformintheRepublicofChina,”Compositevolume,mimeographed(Taipei:FarmersServiceDivision,1965),www.youxs.org.

[3].Ibid.,chap2.

[4].SeeChen,Records,;JCRR,”AnnualReports,”;andTaiwanProvincialLandBureau,”,”mimeographed(Taipei:JCRRTranslation,1950).

[5].JCRR,”AnnualReports,”www.youxs.org.

[6].Ibid.,www.youxs.org

[7].TPLB,”Implementation,www.youxs.org.