第52章 佃农理论英语原著 46
- 作者:张五常
- 类型:综合其他
- 更新时间:2021-07-04 15:14:11
- 章节字数:6648字
)/rportionofrentwereassignedexclusivelytoanindividualtenant(ortenants),say,throughtheissuanceofstocksagainstthemarketvalueofthegivenland,,eachjointownerwouldtherebybd,rentalpercentagerestrictionliesnotinthelandownerssharebeingreduced,but,underthesharerestrictioninTaiwan,therighttolandownershipwasnolongerwhollyexclusive.
,itwillberecalled,thema,themarginalproductoftenantlaborwillneverbenegative.(Thisisimpliedbythemaximizingbehaviorofthelandownerundertheaddedshareconstraint.)Supposeboththerentalpercentageandthenonpecuniarybene-
fitsofowninglandareeffectivelyreducedtozero;thatis,privatelandownershipisreducedtoameretitle,;petitionamongtenantswillpushlaborinputtopointk,wherethewagerateequalstheaverageproductoflabor,,themarginalproductoflaborinthiscasemaybenegative.[2]Thatistosay,iftheentireinefromlandisunassignedtoanyindividualorprivateparty,landbeesamonpropertyresource(inourcase,withaprivatetitle),andpetitionamongusersimpliesthatnonlandresourceswillbeallocatedtolanduntiltheinetoland(rent)iszero.[3]
Fromtheabovediscussionwemaygeneralize:Foranyproductionfunctionrequiringresourceinputshandt,iftherighttoaportionoftheinefromh,howeversmall,isnotappropriatedorexclusivelyassigned,theratiot/hwillriseunderpetition,implyingafallinthemarginalproductoftandariseinthemarginalproductofh;astheunassignedinefromhincreases,themarginalproductoftwillaccordinglybelower,andmaybe”theproductiontheoremofpropertyrightassignment.”
[1].Thisshouldbedistinguishedfromaninetax,,themisallocationgeneratedbyataxonresourceusestemsnotfromthetaxitself,butfromthefactthatnogovernmentofficialistherebygrantedauthoritytomakedecisionsonresourceuse.
[2].Inthisandmyearlierstatementthatthemarginalproductoftenantlaborwillneverbenegativeif
isgreaterthanzero,theargumentwouldperhapsbemoreconvincingifthemarginalproductoflaborintherelevantrangewerealwayspositive,sothatwhen
=0itisstillpositive(withthewagerateequalingtheaverageproductoflabor).Inthiscasetheincreasesintenantinputwillbegradualandcontinuousinresponsetogradualdecreasesof.
Theoreticallythepossibilityoftheexistenceofsubzeromarginalproductoflaborrequiresnotonly
=0,butalsothesuppositionthatthetitleholdercannotdenytenantfarmingonapetitivebasis.
[3].Withasomewhatdifferentapproach,,”TheEconomicTheoryofaCommon-PropertyResource:TheFishery,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy(August,1954).AnditisimplicitinProfessorPigousimaginativeexampleoftworoads,,TheEconomicsofWelfare(London:Macmillan,&Co.,1920),www.youxs.org,”SomeFallaciesintheInterpretationofSocialCost,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,www.youxs.org(1924).
Thecorrectanalysisexplainingthedissipationofrent,tomymind,isanalogoustoCournotsduopolysolutionwithfreeentry:withrentalinereplacingmonopolyrent,theaggregateaverageproductoflaborreplacingmarketdemandforproduct,andapositivewageinsteadofazerocostofproduction.
www.youxs.org
Theeffectsonresourcereallocationunderthesharerestristhroughwhichtheinitialresourceusemayberestored,thetenantswouldrecieveearningsfromfarminginexcessoftheiralternativeopportunities;butpetitionamongtenantsofferingtoincreasenonlandfarminginputseliminatestheresidualearnings(unlessthemarginalproductofnonlandinputsgoestozero).Undereffectivesharerestriction,emphasiswillbeplacedmoreonthe,andwithalowerrentalpercentagethelandownersrentalinewillbepartiallyrestoredbyahigheroutput.