Iamalsoindebtedtothreesourcesforfinancialaid:totheLillyEndowmentIncorporatedgrantsupportingthestudyofpropertyrightsandbehavioratUCLA,totheUniversityofChicago,fortheirPost-DoctoralFellowshipinPoliticalEconomyfortheacademicyear1967-68，andtotheFordFoundationgrantforInternationalStudiesincludingAgriculturalEconomicsattheUniversityofChicago.

StevenNg-SheongCheung

Chicago,1968

www.youxs.org

www.youxs.org

tureofre,thelandownerprovideslandandthetenantprovideslabor;,definedhereastwoormoreindividualpartiesbiningprivatelyownedresourcesfortheproductionofcertainmutuallyagreedoutputs,theactualoutputstobesharedaccordingtocertainmutuallyacceptedpercentagesasre,tobederivedfromstandardeconomicprinciples,maybegeneralizedtoallformsoflandtenureundersimilarownershipofresources.

Theprevailingimpressionisthatsharetenancyresultsininefficientallocationofresources.[1]Itwillbeshownhere,boththeoreticallyandempirically,whetherthelandownercultivatesthelandhimself,hiresfarmhandstodothetilling,leaseshisholdingsonafixedrentbasis,,differentcontractualarrangementsdonotimplydifferentefficienciesofresourceuseaslonsobtainedprimarilyfromAsianagriculture.

Itremainstoinquirefurtherintothechoiceofcontractsandvariousstipulationsoflandleases;andIshallattempttoshowthatt,however,ifpropertyrightsareattenuatedordeniedasprivate,,inAppendixA,thatseveralhypotheiluretoconsiderthepertinentpropertylaws.

Thesecondpartofthisstudyappliesthetheoryofsharetenancytoasituationinwhi,whichareoffsettingcontractualrearrang,relatingtoresourcereallocation,beessignificantonlyifpensat,thetheoryofsharetenancyimpliesincreasedfarmingintensi,evidencewillbepresentedtoconfirmthatundereffectiverentalsharereductionthemarginalproductoflandintenantfarmswillbehigher,andthemarginalproductsoftenantinputswillbelower,thanthoseofsimilarresourcesemployedelsewhere.

AlthoughsimilarrentalsharerestrictionshavebeenenactedinseveralAsiancountries,,duringthefirstphaseoftheTaiwanlandreformprogram,therentalsharereductionwascarriedoutbeforeotherreformmeasureswereintroduced.[2]Thus,therewasaperiodofthreeyearsinwhichwecaninvestigatethereallocationofres,inTaiwanboththeprovisionsoftherentalsharereductionandtheirenforcementarerestrictiveenoughtorevealsomeofthemajorimplicationsderivedfromthetheoryofsharetenancy.

[1].Classicaleconomistsaside,contemporarythesesonsharetenancywhichimplyinefficientresourceallocationinclude:RainerSchickele,”EffectofTenureSystemsonAgriculturalEfficiency,”JournalofFarmEconomics（February,1941）；EarlHeady,”EconomicsofFarmLeasingSystems,”JournalofFarmEconomics（August,1947）；EarlHeadyandEarlKehrberg,”RelationshipofCrop-ShareandCashLeasingSystemstoFarmingEfficiency,”ResearchBulletin（IowaStateCollegeAgriculturalExperimentStation,May,1952）；CharlesIssawi,”FarmOutputunderFixedRentsandShareTenancy,”LandEconomics（February,1957）；www.youxs.org,”EconomicTheoryandAgrarianEconomics,”OxfordEconomicPapers（February,1960）；,”PeasantsandDualismwithorwithoutSurplusLabor,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy（October,1960）.