Thereareexceptions,,www.youxs.org”ResourceAllocationunderShareContracts,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy（April,1950）,isreluctanttoacceptthe,ChineseFarmEconomy（Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1930）；,”FarmTenancyandProductivityinAgriculture:TheCaseoftheUnitedStates,”FoodResearchInstituteStudies（1963）.Weshalldiscussthisinchapter3.

[2].InthePhilippines,forexample,therentalsharerestrictionwasca,”PhilippineLandReform,1950-1958,”InternationalCooperationAdministration,USOMIPhilippines（Manila,1958）.

www.youxs.org

Thedefinitionofala”landreform”hdistributionorresourceallocation.

InTaiwan,forexample,themuchpublicizedfarmlandreformdidnotspringupatonetime:itwastheproductofaserieso,,thecrucialarticlesofwhichwillbediscussedinthenextsection,,atotalofover350articleswereappendedtodefinetheTaiwanlandreform.[1]Despiteitsplexity,wemaygenerallydividethereformintothreephases.

Thefirstphaseinvolvedarentlimitationprogram,,,promulgatedandenforcedinTaiwanfromApril14,1949.[2]Thesecondsetincludesthirty-onearticles,promulgatedonJune7,1951,andintendedtogointoeffectinFebruary1952.[3]Whiletheprovisionsofbothwillbeexaminedinlaterchapters,itistheeconomicimplicationsofthefirstsetuponwhichIshallconcentrate,forIcouldfindnoevidencethatthesecondsetwasactuallyenforced.

Thesecondphaseofthelandreformpertainstothesaleofpubliclandstoestablishowner-farmers.[4]Thisprogram,promulgatedinJune1951andcarriedoutfromJuly1951toJune1953,coveredaportiono[5]Thethirdphaseisthemos”Land-to-the-TillerAct,”,landholdingsofaprivatelandowhelandbeingpurchased,paidbytenumericalprices,,transfersoflandrightsamongindividualswereprohibited.[6]NeitherthesecondnorthethirdphaseoftheTaiwanlandreformwillbecoveredinthisstudy.

Despitethefactthatthereformprovisionsareseveralandvaried,thecontractto”protect”:

fulnessandlandownershiphadbeeanobstacletofurtherdevelopmentofagricultureaswellasindustry……Withthelimitedfarmlandandtheirrationaltenuresystem,ruralunderemploymentpresentedaseriousproblem.[7]

Asecondjustificationofferedisthatfarmingundertenancy,andsharetenancyinparticular,iseconomicallyinefficientonthreecounts.[8]（1）（2）Thetenantsincentivetofarmwasdiscouragedbyasharecontract,sincepartofeveryunitofoutputproducedwouldgotothelandownerasrent.（3）And,sincetherentalscollectedbylandownerswereexorbitantlyhigh,thetenantslackedtheabilitytoinvest.

Athirdjustif,asharecontract,theyclaimed,,theevidencetheycitetosupportthe”exploitation”argumentisperhapscontradictorytotheirclaimofinefficienttenancy:forexample,landownersfrequentlystipulatedthattheirtenantsprovideseedsandfertilizers,andrequiredthattheyworkhard.[9]