Toillustrate,,thelandownerwillbeabletochargearentequaltothemaximumof（q-f）/hperacre,orar,andthearearentedbythetenantwillagainbeT1,/handf/hasshown,ifanarealargerthanT1isrented,,ifanareasmallerthanT1isrented,t,underfixedrent,thelandsizeperfarmandtherentalannuityreceivedbythelandownerwillbeexactlythesameasundersharetenancy.[1]Furthermore,ifthesamecropsaretobeplantedonthesamegradeofland,havingthesameproductionfunction,thetenantunderfixedrentwillhavetomitthesamef/,ifonetenantdoesnotpossessthenecessaryamountofinputs,hemayacquirethemthroughvariousmeansorrentafarmwhichrequireslessfarminginputs.

Letusalsopressthequestion:Undersharetenancy,whatcriteriawillthecontractingpartiesuseinarrivingattheequi-libriumlandsizeandrentalpercentageforeachtenant?Clearly,themostefficienttypeofcropstobeplantedonthegivenlandmustbechosen,andthetenantinputsrequire,erroneousdeci,however,thatsome,thereexist,atprevailingmarketpricesoflandandotherfactorsofproduction,certainbinationsoftenantinputrequirements,rentalpercentages,andtenantlandsizes.

Indeed,givenfreelyalienable（marketable）landrightsunderprivateownership,,iftherentalpercentageistoolow,thelandsizepertenanttoolarge,orthetenantinputsrequiredtoolittle,therentalannuityasaret,thelandownerwilleithermaketheproperadjustments,leasethelandtoadifferenttenant,chooseadifferentcontractualarrangement,,ifthecontractualagreementsaresuchthatthetenantisreceivingasharelowerthanhisalternativeearning,otherlandownerswillbidhisservicesaway,orthetenantmayturntowagelabor.

Aswithpetitionamonglandowners,petitionamon,bycheckingtheoutputalonethelandownerwillknowwhetherthecontractedtermsarerespectedb,however,thetransactionsarefrequenldmakenodecisionandthereforewereexploited,itisrefreshingtopointoutthat,inChinaatleast,sharecontractingwasratherpolite:

Assoonasthegrainisthreshedthetenantinvitesthelandlordtoafeast,afterwhich,hetakesthesailsfromthewindmilljustbeforethelandlordestothetenantsfeastasasigntothelandlordofhisintentions.[2]

Ouranalysisthu,inwhichwediscusspr,andperformtestsofimplicationsforalternativetheories.

[1].Forstillanotherexpositiononthis,seechapter3,sectionC.

[2].（Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1930）,www.youxs.org.

www.youxs.org

Perhapsthetheoreticalresultsreachedintheprecedingchapterwouldhavebeenobtainedbyea,asrent,ityieldstheimpressionofbeingsimilartoanadvaloremexcisetax-wherepartofeveryunitproducedis”taxed”bythelandowner（government）.Thedistributionofoutputisnotthesame,itisbelieved,aswithfixedrentorow,therefore,issaidtoresultinlessintensive（andlessefficient）farmingbecausethetenantsincentivetoworkorinvestinlandisreduced.[1]

Itisnotdifficulttoshowthattheapplicationoftheanalysisofataxtosharetenancy（hereaftercalledthe”tax-equivalent”approach）,thewritersgenerallyfailtorealizethatthepercentagesharesandarearentedundersharetenancyarenotmysteriously”fixed”,thesewritersfailtospecifythenatureo