[24].Ibid.,www.youxs.org.,”PeasantsandDualismwithorwithoutSurplusLabor,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy（October,1966）,www.youxs.org.

[25].Johnson,”ResourceAllocation,”www.youxs.org.

[26].Ibid.,v.,www.youxs.org.

[27].Ibid.,www.youxs.org:

Ihaveestare-rentedthanoncash-rentedfarms.

[28].Ibid.,www.youxs.org.

[29].Ibid.,www.youxs.org

[30].Ibid.,www.youxs.org.

[31].Ibid.,www.youxs.org.

[32].Ibid.,www.youxs.org.

[33].Ibid.,www.youxs.org.

www.youxs.org

Toclarifythebasicdifferencebetweenthetheoryofsharetenancyderivedinthelastchapterandthetax-equivalentanalysis,,,

,andthemarginaltenantreceiptundersharerent,

（1-r）.Accordingtothetax-equivalentapproach,equilibriumisatA,withtheamountoftenantinputequaltot1.

Infigure5,assumeagivenlandareawhichweholdfixedfor.

=www.youxs.org

（1-r）,ift2oftenantlaboriscontractuallystipulated,thelandownersshareofthetotalproductintheformofrentequalsareaEDBC,,thetenantsshareisstillhigherthanhisalternativeearning（areaOMBt2）,withareaMEAgreaterthanareaABC,whichmeansthatthetotalrent（areaEDBC）willbesmallerthanthatofawageorafixed-rentcontract（areaMDB）.Giventhemarginaltenantreceipt,

（1-r）,thecorrespondingaveragetenantreceiptwillbe（q/t）（1-r）,whichis40percentoftheaverageproductoftenantlabor,q/t,,thelandownercansuccess-fullystipulatethatthetenantworkuptot3wheretheaveragetenantreceipt,（q/t）（1-r）,equalsthewagerate,implyingthatthetenantsinefromfarmingisequaltohisalternativeearning.

Withtenantinputt3,however,thetotalrentreceivedbythelandownerwillbeequaltoareaMDBminusareaBNP,anamountofrentsmallerthanthatofownercultivation,nantcost,thelandownerwillthusraisetherentalpercentagetor*.Thechoiceofr*lowersthemarginaltenantreceipttothedottedlineGF,withareaMGKequaltoareaKBLThecorrespondingaveragetenantreceiptwillbe（q/t）（1-r*）,whichnecessarilycutsthemarginalproductoflabor,

,www.youxs.org（whichequalsareaMDB）,andthetenantsshareequalsareaOGIt2,whichisnogreaterthanhisalternativeearning（areaOMBt2）.Theequilibriumconditioncanbeiden-tified:atBwehave

wherer*istheequilibriumrentalpercentage.[1]Indeed,oneofthemainsourcesofconfusioninthetaxapproachisthemarginaltenantreceiptcurve,

（1-r）.Importantasitmayseem,itisonlyillusoryfordecisionmakingunderunrestrainedprivatepropertyrights.

Indeed,acloseranalysisrevealsthatpositionAisnotanequilibrium,evenifwefollowthetax-equivalentapproachtoanenantinputperacre,（infigure5）,thetenantwillchoosetodispersehisinputresourceovermanyfarmsuntilhisinputendowmentisexhausted,insuchawaythathismarginaline（ormarginaltenantreceipt）fromdifferentfarmsisequal.[2]Inthiscase,thetenantwillbereceivinganaggregateinehigherthanhisalternativeearning,andothertenantswillentertopete.

msalso,,themarginalinefromdifferentfarmsforeachtenantwillfall,antishigherthanthealternativeearning.[3]Given

（1-r）asdrawn,andassumingthatthelandownerscontractuallyacceptanyamountoflabor,petitionamongtenantswillpushlaborinputoneachfarm（onesuchfarmisrepresentedbyfigure5）”overcrowded”,wealthmaximizationimpliesthatthelandownerswillchooseamongtenantswhoofferrentalpercentagesashighasr*,*whichdefines

（1-r*）,theamountoftenantlabnantlaborineachfarmequalsthemarginaltenantcost（pointBinfigure5）.