Theresourceallocationimpliedbytheaboveequilibrium,whilesatisfyingtheParetocondition,takesaninterestingformwhichhasyettobeobserved:Therearemanytenantsworkingononefarmwitheachtenantmittingatrivialamountoflabor;eachtenantworksonmanyfarms,,thisisidenticalwiththeformunderwhicheachtenantmitsallhislaborinputstoonefarm,weneverobservetenantsdispersingtheirinputsamongmanyfarmsasdescribedbecausetransactioncosts,andinparticularthecostofcontractingandthecostofmovingfromfarmtofarm,arenotzero.

[1].Inalessprehensiveform,thisisanalternativeexpressionoftheresultsobtainedinchapter2.

[2].Supposethemarginaltenantreceiptcurvesrisebeforefalling,,thetenant（whoisnowentirelyfreetochoose）willdispersehistotalinputsuntiltheaveragetenantreceipt,（q/t）（1-r）,foreachfarmisatamaximum,portionsunderlinearhomogeneity.

Indeed,underprivateownershipofresources,itisdifficulttod,however,aninterestingsetofconditionsforpositionAcanbespecified:（a）thatlandownershipbelongstothestateandthegovernmentarbi-trarilyassignslandtotenantswithrentscollectedonasharebasis;（b）thatthetenantisfreetoworkelsewhereatamarketwagerateandtheamountoflaborheusesonthestatelandisnotstipulated;and（c）tha,itappearsthatequilibriumwillbeatA,andtheresidualearningsforthegovernmenttenantsaresimilarto”welfare”veinmind.

[3].Iftheindustrysupplyoftenantlaborisrising,,andthewagerateusedinfigure5istheonefinallydeterminedinthemarket.

www.youxs.org

etenancyin1950,Chinesewritersmade,attacksonfarmingundertenancyweremon,andt,www.youxs.org.[1]

Theaforementionedfindings,inadequateastheymayseem,constitutethemostprehensivebodyofevidencerelatingtoagricult,togetherwithfindingsfromelsewhereinAsia,,however,thatineveryinstanceweuseonlydatacollectedfromperiodsandlocationswheretheexistingsystemofpropertyrightsconformst,thepostwarfarmlandreformsruleouttheuseofAsianagriculturaldataofthepasttwentyyearsinthispartofthestudy.

Applyingtheimplicationsofalternativetheoriesofsharetenancytoobservations,wecanperformseveralsimpletests.

Accordingtothestandardtheoryofsharetenancyderivedinchapter2,giventheproductionfunction,therentalpercentaged,weshouldobserveahigherrentalper-centageif（a）thelandismorefertileor（b）thecostoftenantinputsislower.[2]Evidenceconfirmingthishypothesisisstrong:

www.youxs.org（1921-25）,www.youxs.org:

Asrentthetenantgivesthelandlordone-halfofthegrainandstrawfromwheatandriceland,two-fifthsofthegrainandstrawfromricelandonly,andthree-tenthsofthegrainandstrawfrompoorland.[3]

Likewise,itwasobservedinKweichowProvince（1929-30）that:

,foruppergradelandtherentalshareis60percent;formediumgrade50percent;andforlowergrade40percent.[4]

Casualobservationsaside,numericaldatashowingthesamepatternswerecollectedbytheLegislativeYuan（China,1930）andtheDepartmentofInternalAffairs（China,1932）.[5]ThefindingsofthelatterhavebeenputedandplacedinAppendixB,becausetheyenpasstwenty-twoprovincesinChinawithsevengradesofland.

www.youxs.org.[6]Thisimpliesthathigherrentalpercentagesweregenerallyassociatedwiththemorefertilepaddyfieldsunderafreemarket.