Anycontractbiningresourcesfromdifferentownersforproductioninvolves,inadditiontonegotiationcosts,theenforcementcostsofcontrollinginputsanddistributingoutput,sawhole（thesumofnegotiationandenforcementcosts）,amongotherthings,includetherentalpercentage,theratioofnonlandinputtoland,andthetypesofcropstobegrown.[11],however,giventhemarketprices,onepartyalonecandecidehowmucld,rafixed-rentorawagecontract.

Therankin,the”shirking”oflaborinput,whichmayexistinawagecontract（alsoinasharecontract）withouteitherenforcingtheinputorcheckingtheoutput,iscostlytoprevent.[12]Butwhilethis”shirking”problemdoesnotappearsignificantforlandinputinafixed-rentcontract,policing（orenforcing）themaintenanceofsoilandotherassetsownedbythelandlordismorecostlyforafixed-rentorasharecontractthanforawagecontract.[13]Ifweaccepttheabovereasoning,pendingempiricalconfirmation,andiftransactioncostistheonlyconsideration,thentheminimiza,then,aresharecontractschosen?

,definedheretomeanthatanindividual,giventhesameexpectedaverageine,,variablesexogenoustotheproductionfunction,suchasweatherconditionsandpests,areriskfactorswhicharedifficulttofore,thetenantbearsmost,ifnotall,oftherisk;underawagecontract,thelandownerbearsmost,ifnotall,（orriskdispersion）；thatis,the,asharecontractwillbemutuallypreferredbythelandownerandthetenant.[14]Risk,however,,then,arefixed-rentandwagecontractschosenatall?

Isuggestthatthechoiceofcontractbeanalyzedbyemployingbo,ah,giventhetransactioncost,riskaversionimpliesthatassetvaluesandthevariancesofinearenegativelyrelated.[15]Whileinitselfthedispersionofriskunderasharecontractwillleadtohighervaluesforthecon-tractedresources,（orutilitymaximization,dependingontherelevantmeasurementproblem）im-pliesthatthecontractualarrangementchosenwillbetheonewhichyieldsthehighestvaluesforthecontractedresources.

Giventhevarianceofoutputvalueandtherentalpercentage,asharecontractprescr,however,asharecontractwillbechosenratherthanafixedrentorawagecontractifthehighe,ofcourse,stillotherarra,thetransactioncostofanarrangementforriskdispersionmoreflexiblethanasharecontractmaybesohighastomakeitundesirable.

Evidenceisavailabletosupporttheapplicabilityofthiskindofanalysis:

www.youxs.org（aninsurancepany）weretoinsuretheexpectedmeanyield,thecontractingpartieswouldchooseafixed-rentcontractandwouldbewillingtopaytheinsuringpartyanamountnohigherthanthesavingfromalowertransactioncostplusapremiumforthealmos,perhaps,isthatthecostofhandlinginsurancetransactionsmaybesohighastobeprohibitive:theinsuringagentwouldhavet（sharecropping）,however,ConstantiaMaxwellobserved:

TheusualprocedureforFrenchseigneurswas,whileretainingthechateauanditsimmediateneighborhoodfortheirownuse,toletouttheirlandsingrostomiddlemenorfermiers（tobedistinguishedfromfermiersexploitants）,whopaidafixedsumtotheproprietorandgatheredth,likethelandlords,wereabsenteesandworkedtheestatethroughsub-agents.[16]