[12].Forthetenantsincentivetouseanamountofinputlessthanthatstipulatedinasharecontract,seechapter3,ngto”shirking”problemsandenforcementco,apiece-ratecontractwillbepreferredtoawagecon,withpieceratestheworkerisinclinedtobe”sloppy”,apiece-ratecontractwillbelesspreferableifthephysicalattributesofthep,missionpayments（aswithinsurancesalesmen）arepreferredtootherformswhenthevalueofoutputdependsontheintensityofworkpersale;”tipping”payments（asinthecaseofwaitresses）arepreferredtootherformswhenthequalityofservicesissignificant-ineithercase,thecostsofenforcing”intensity”and”quality”ofworkappeartoberelativelyhigh.

[13].Inhorticulture,forexample,theusua,ownermanagementinvo,oneexpectsthatwagecontractswouldbeinfrequentwhenthelandholdingislarge,forhighcostsoflaborsupervisionwouldbeincurred.

[14].,”CapitalAssetPrices:ATheoryofMarketEquilibriumunderConditionsofRisk,”JournalofFinance（September,1964）；JackHirshleifer,”InvestmentDecision:Choice-TheoreticApproaches”；andidem,”InvestmentDecisionunderUncertainty:ApplicationsoftheState-PreferenceApproach,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics（May,1966）.”Risk-exchange”modelsderivedfromthecurrentstate-preferenceandmean-varianceapproaches,withtheaidofanEdgeworth-Bowleybox,suggestthatrisksharingispreferred-ifweignoretransactioncosts.

[15].Foratheoreticaltreatmentofassetpricesandriskpremiumsasdeterminedinthemarketplace,seeSharpe,”CapitalAssetPrices.”

[16].ArthurYoung,TravelsinFranceduringtheYears1787,1788,and1789,www.youxs.org.（CambridgeUniversityPress,1929）,www.youxs.org.

[17].Tointerprettheexis”farmers”inEngland,”farmers”isasfollows:acollectingagentwhoisallowedtotakethedifferencebetweenwhathecancollectandwhathehastopaytheCrownhasagreater,Ibelieve,iscorrect,andcanbeexpressedalternatively:transactioncostsdiffer,amongotherthings,becausedifferentsetsofstipulationsrequirevaryingeffortsinenforcementandnegotiation;andforcollectiona”farming””farming”agentaswellasan”insuring”agent.

[18].SeeTakekazuOgura,ed.,AgriculturalDevelopmentinModernJapan（Tokyo:JapanFAOAssociation,1963）,heintroductionofthepulsorycropinsurance.

[19].See,forexample,www.youxs.org；,”FarmTenancyandProductivityinAgriculture:TheCaseoftheUnitedStates,”FoodResearchInstituteStudies,www.youxs.org（1963）.

[20].SeeAppendixB;DepartmentofInternalAffairs,PublicReportsofInternalAffairs,www.youxs.org（1932）；LegislativeYuan,StatisticalMonthly2,5（1930）；andShu-ChingLee,”TheHeartofChinasProblem,theLandTenureSystems,”JournalofFarmEconomics（October,1946）.

www.youxs.org（China,1925-40）

InthisandthefollowingsectionIshallanaementsarechosentodisperseriskbearingandminimizetransactioncost,butalsotof,,butalsoonthefactthatduringthisperiodinChina,some93percentofthefarmlandwasheldunderprivateownership.[1]Letmebeginbytranslatingafewsamplecontractsoffixedrent.

Samplea-fixed（crop）rentcontractwithdefiniteleaseduration（ShantungProvince）：

TenantAnowleasesfromlandownerB[somanyacres],withthepresenceofrefereeD,thattheannualrentperacreincludes[somanycatties]ofwheat,and[somanycatties]ofmillet,soybeans,,,rentalpaymentsshallbeadjusted[downward][somanyyears].[2]

Sampleb-fixed（crop）rentcontractwithindefiniteleasedura-tion（KiangsiProvince）：

Wecontractuallyestablishaniron-sheet[firmlyfixed]rent……Regardlessofgoodorbadyears,notafractionofrentcanbereduced……Intheeventthattherentalpaymentisreducedordelayed,thelandownerisfreetotakebacktheland,togetherwithallexistingcrops,andtocontractanewtenantforcultivation……Furthermore,thelandownershallpaythetenant20coppercoinsforthedeliveryofevery100cattiesofgrains.[3]

Samplec-fixed（crop）rentcontractwithlandownerprovidingnonlandfarminginputs（TsinghaiProvince）：